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This paper defends a distinctly liberal approach to public health ethics and replies to possible objections. In par-
ticular,Ilookatasetofrecentproposalsaimingtoreviseandexpandliberalisminlightofpublichealth’srationale
and epidemiological ﬁndings. I argue that they fail to provide a sociologically informed version of liberalism. In-
stead, they rest on an implicit normative premise about the value of health, which I show to be invalid. I then
make explicit the unobvious, republican background of these proposals. Finally, I expand on the liberal under-
standing of freedom as non-interference and show its advantages over the republican alternative of freedom as
non-domination within the context of public health. The views of freedom I discuss in the paper do not overlap
with the classical distinction between negative and positive freedom. In addition, my account diﬀerentiates the
concepts of freedom and autonomy and does not rule out substantive accounts of the latter. Nor does it conﬁne
political liberalism to an essentially procedural form.
Introduction
The establishment of public health ethics as a discipline
initsown rightseemsinnatelyrelated toquestioningthe
suitability of a liberal framework (Dawson and Verweij,
2007:8).Forinstance,itisoftenarguedthatalthoughlib-
eral approaches are congenial to bioethics and its focus
on individual choices and patients’ autonomy, liberal-
ism lacks the conceptual tools necessary to tackle the
intricacies of public health ethics such as an irreducible
concept of public good that a republican or communi-
tarian strategy would be able to offer (Nufﬁeld Council
onBioethics,2007;Jennings,2007a,b).Essentially,these
proposals contend that if epidemiological ﬁndings are
taken into proper consideration, liberalism should make
roomforpublichealthinterventionsthatgobeyondstan-
dardconstraintssuchasrespectforbasiclibertiesandin-
dividual choices, the harm principle and the conception
of freedom as non-interference.
In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to es-
tablish public health ethics on essentially revised liberal
groundsaremisconceived.Mystrategywillbeasfollows.
Intheopeningsection,Iprovidealogicalreconstruction
of a cluster of views whose constitutive feature is this
apparent dissatisfaction with liberalism in public health
ethics.Theobjectiveistomakeexplicitanunderlyingar-
gument that could animate these views and to relate it to
broader,initiallyappealingcriticismsagainstliberalism.I
thenoutlineitscontinuitywithsomeprimafaciereasons
forpreferringarepublicanalternative.Insubsequentsec-
tions, I critically examine what appear to be the two key
premisesofthereconstructedargument.Theﬁrstisnor-
mative. It takes health to be an overarching value. The
second comprises speciﬁc interpretations of epidemio-
logical evidence that presumably expose liberalism as a
sociologicallyna¨ ıveapproachtopublichealth.Thethrust
of my analysis in these sections is twofold. First, it pur-
ports to show that the prior, normative premise should
be rejected because it derives from conﬂating pruden-
tial and moral reasons for valuing health and fails to
respect its complex axiological structure. Second, it aims
to demonstrate that the posterior, presumably empirical
premisebuildsupontheinvalidassumptionthathealthis
anoverarchingvalue.Hence,thispremisecannotbeused
to support increasingly prescriptive policies as informed
extensionsofaliberalcommitmenttopublichealth.This
latter point indicates that such proposals effectively dis-
engage with central liberal values and should be con-
ceived as part of a different, republican project. In the
ﬁnal section, I reply to the challenges against liberalism
outlined at the beginning of the paper and demonstrate
its superiority over the republican alternative in the con-
text of public health. In light of this analysis, I conclude
that the liberal commitment to the value of toleration
should be paramount within public health ethics.
A major advantage of the proposed strategy consists
in its capacity to both explain the popularity of recur-
rent criticisms against liberalism in public health ethics
and show that these concerns are unfounded. Here, ‘lib-
eralism’ stands primarily for procedural, e.g., Rawlsian
liberalism. The rationale is that this strand relies more
heavilyontheconceptionoffreedomasnon-interference
and invites a narrower understanding of the harm
principle than perfectionist theories, which commit to
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additional values, such as autonomy. However, freedom
asnon-interferenceandarestrictiveharmprincipleseem
to be the main target of the criticisms mentioned above.
In particular, they both are deemed incongruous with
standard deﬁnitions of public health, which include col-
lectiveinitiativesinthepursuitofirreduciblypublicgoals
(Verweij and Dawson, 2007). Thus, my defence of liber-
alism will focus on these challenged features and aim to
deal with ensuing criticisms on their own terms. Nev-
ertheless, it directly applies to more substantive forms
of liberalism as long as they intend to eliminate abusive
conditions of choice rather than discount some choices
as non-autonomous by default (Scanlon, 1988). Joseph
Raz’s Morality of Freedom is an example of such a lib-
eral yet substantive approach. Conceptions that do not
satisfy the preceding condition will not be considered as
distinctively liberal.
In addition, the following discussion presupposes a
distinction between the concepts of freedom and auton-
omy and focus on the former (Feinberg, 1986; Dworkin,
1988: 3–33). My argument relates to the latter insofar
as freedom facilitates personal autonomy, both in its de-
velopment and exercise. As a result, the issues raised
about the value of health do not undermine value-laden
conceptions of autonomy, e.g., Oshana (2006), but only
suggest that health cannot sustain such a conception.
Finally, the central distinction between freedom as
non-interference and freedom as non-domination dif-
fers from that between negative and positive freedom
(Berlin, 1958). For both strategies of deﬁning freedom
share aspects that belong to both sides of the classical
divide.
Non-interference and Its Perceived
Weaknesses
As stated in the Introduction, this section aims to re-
construct an underlying argument that could sustain the
frequent claims that liberalism is an awkward match for
public health ethics. A promising starting point would
betomaintainthattheliberalunderstandingoffreedom
as non-interference is at odds with the underpinnings
of public health policy. The ‘harm principle’ stating that
one’s freedom may be legitimately constrained only in
order to prevent harm to others is criticised as an in-
sufﬁcient corrective to the primary focus on individuals.
Although its original formulation by Mill (1859) is sig-
niﬁcantly more complex (Dawson and Verweij, 2008),
its rationale is persistently associated with the protec-
tion of individuals from potentially interfering powerful
institutions (Hart, 1963; Feinberg, 1984; Ripstein, 2006;
Bird, 2007). As explained earlier, I shall not elaborate
further on the harm principle at this point, but take
for granted this narrow interpretation, which is both
widely accepted by political philosophers and typically
addressed by its critics within public health ethics, e.g.,
Jennings (2007a,b). I shall though return to this issue in
the two ﬁnal sections and argue that a narrow version of
the harm principle is, in fact, apposite to public health
matters.Forthemoment,however,Ishallconcentrateon
making it clear why freedom as non-interference might
be considered out of tune.
The standard criticism against liberalism for holding
an a ¨ ıve view of rational agents as ‘unencumbered selves’
and ignoring the importance of social bonds and inter-
personalcontextseemstohithome(Sandel,1982).From
this perspective, freedom as non-interference would
seem prone to uphold the appearance of individual
choices, which may conceal the effects of prior, system-
atic oppression. Subtler forms of coercion remain un-
detected. Their victims are not identiﬁed as such. Nor
are the harms inﬂicted on them countered by the pub-
lic authorities. Instead, such harms are perceived as the
result of free, although perhaps imprudent, choices that
are subject to liberal toleration.
Some critiques of cosmetic surgery exemplify this line
ofreasoning.Theiraimistoshowthatbycondoningthis
practice, liberal democracies fail to protect some of their
vulnerable citizens from important physical, psycho-
logical and political harms (Marzano, 2002; Chambers,
2008). These critiques point out the persistent gender
inequalities that push women towards cosmetic surgery
and contest its interpretation as a coincidence of unre-
lated individual choices to enhance one’s looks.
In a similar vein, the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics
maintains that ‘the state has a duty to help everyone lead
a healthy life and to reduce health inequalities’ (2007:
Summary). However, this duty is undermined by the
standard formulation of the ‘harm principle’, which in-
sulates unhealthy choices such as smoking and binge
drinking from direct state intervention. Yet, the Nufﬁeld
Council argues, these choices largely pertain to disad-
vantaged strata of the population and therefore should
not be presumed free. In fact, citizens’ fundamental in-
terestinbeinghealthyisconsideredasasufﬁcientreason
fordiscountingharmfulindividualchoicesasprimafacie
unfree. They are likely to be either uninformed, or they
make such unhealthy choices due to peer pressure and
disadvantaged background (2.22–2.33). A ‘stewardship
model’ of public authority is deemed a more appropri-
ate starting point than classical liberalism. This alterna-
tive model bestows the state with the objective to en-
ablehealthylifestylesandpaysparticularattentiontothePUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND LIBERALISM • 137
vulnerableandthedisadvantaged(2.41–2.45).Tothisef-
fect, it proposes an ‘intervention ladder’ of public health
measures, which gradually become more invasive. They
startfrommonitoringthesituationandprovidinginfor-
mation to restricting and eliminating unhealthy individ-
ual choices. The Nufﬁeld Council insists that whenever
possible,thedesiredhealthoutcomesshouldbeachieved
via the least intrusive measures. Nevertheless, the au-
thors contend that the failure of less restrictive policies
should lead to the implementation of more restrictive
ones, provided that the expected health beneﬁts still off-
set the interference with people’s lives and ﬁnancial cost
(3.17–3.18).
TheNufﬁeldCouncilassertsthattheseunderpinnings
are not illiberal. On the contrary, they are perceived as
a more coherent framework for the liberal commitment
to individual freedom. This view ﬁnds support in recent
epidemiologicalstudiesthatascertaintheparamountim-
portance of the social gradient of health (Marmot, 2004;
Wilkinson, 2005; Marmot and Wilkinson, 2006). Their
ﬁndings suggest that unhealthy behaviours are broadly
determined by adverse circumstance and lack of oppor-
tunity and contend that individual choices are less sig-
niﬁcant healthwise than the social environment.
A further objection to the conception of freedom as
non-interference points towards its inability to appreci-
ate irreducibly social goods (Taylor, 1995). For instance,
Rawlsian primary goods such as liberties, opportuni-
ties and income matter because they are essential all-
purpose means and could further any particular plan of
life (Rawls, 1971: §15; 1993: V, §§3–4). Their worth de-
rivesfromthepursuitofindividualprojectsanddoesnot
transcend the aggregate value that they have for each in-
dividual beneﬁciary. Therefore Rawlsian primary goods
are social only in the sense that it is impossible to pro-
vide them ‘in such a way as to beneﬁt a single individual,
but must beneﬁt many or none’ (Taylor, 1995: 129). In
contrast, a Rawlsian framework does not leave room for
irreducibly social goods, the value of which partly de-
pends on the common appreciation that they inspire.
For instance, the value of equal social relationships can-
not be reduced to that of curtailing each other’s oppres-
siveintentions.Infact,itcanhardlyberealisedwithouta
general consideration for the ideal of equality (Schefﬂer,
2005).
This apparent failure to grasp that some fundamental
goodsareirreduciblysocialarguablypromptsanunhelp-
ful attitude towards public goals and, inter alia, public
health. For the pursuit of these might be suspected to
collide with individual freedoms. Yet, no individual plan
can be meaningfully articulated in the absence of irre-
duciblysocialgoods(Taylor,1989).Theliberalinsistence
on non-interference is deemed to be liberty-diminishing
in this respect. It reduces the range of opportunities for
everybody as it invites people to think of their interests
in isolation from public ones. As a result, it brings for-
ward misguided dilemmas between individual freedom
and the public good. Debates about public health inter-
ventions often seem dominated by these. For instance, it
is widely acknowledged that a legal cap on weekly work-
ing hours provides important public health beneﬁts and
reduces the risk of various conditions associated with
overwork, some of which are cardiovascular disease, de-
pression and diabetes. Yet, some persistently oppose the
measure claiming that it would interfere with one’s free-
domtoworkaslongasonepleases.However,thisalleged
freedom is problematic. It exposes the disadvantaged to
economic and managerial pressures and condones the
resulting harms (Bunting, 2004; Gillan, 2005).
These perceived weaknesses of freedom as non-
interference seem to be avoided by the republican al-
ternative, which conceives freedom as non-domination.
Republican philosophers consider interference as irrele-
vant in itself. Instead, they suggest that individual free-
dom is undermined by the potential for arbitrary use of
power. This power may never be exercised as a matter of
fact. The sheer capacity to exercise it at will sufﬁces for
complete domination. Its background presence utterly
corruptsindividualchoicesandsubvertsthefoundations
ofautonomousagency.Infact,thedominatedhabitually
committoextensiveself-censorshipinordertopre-empt
repression(Pettit,1997;Skinner,1998).Conversely,legit-
imateinterferencedoesnotthreatenindividualfreedom.
It is a case of ‘friendly coercion’, which focuses on the
interests of the coerced rather than the coercing party.
‘Friendly coercion’ engages the coerced in a reasoned
discussion and restores their control over future deci-
sions. As a result, legitimate interference is seen as a way
to reinstate individual freedom. Unlike abusive power, it
is based on reasons and their validity is recognisable by
those who experience legitimate interference. The avow-
ableinterestsofthesepeoplearetherebyrespected(Pettit,
2001: 65–103; 156–160).
Theappealoftheprecedingargumentlargelydepends
on some implicit assumptions. Its conclusion that free-
dom as non-interference provides an inadequate foun-
dation for public health ethics resonates with the idea
that inattention to health results primarily from covert
oppression rather than proper choice. This supposition
builds on the following two premises. The ﬁrst premise
is, health is an overarching value. It is unlikely that an-
other value can take precedence over it as a result of a
defensible choice. The second premise is, once liberal-
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gradient of health, liberal proposals would by and large
converge with the preceding communitarian and repub-
lican insights. The next two sections will look at each
premise in turn.
The Value of Health
Inarecentpaper,GostinandStoneassertthat‘thepublic
health community takes it as an act of faith that health
mustbesociety’soverarchingvalue.’(2007:66).Theyap-
provingly quote Franklin Roosevelt according to whom
nothingcouldbemoreimportanttoastatethanitspub-
lic health and criticise Western governments for failing
to appreciate this insight.
I nf a c t ,i ti sr a r ef o rt h i sp r e m i s et ob es oe x p l i c i t l y
endorsed. Some may even doubt whether the preced-
ing statement should be taken literally rather than scaled
downtotheuncontroversialanduninterestingclaimthat
health is surely important. Yet, thearray of congenial, al-
though less overt observations in the literature suggest
that the assertion that health is an overarching value
should be taken in earnest. For instance, the popularity
of public health rhetoric in political discourse points to-
wardstheparamountimportancethatthegeneralpublic
attributes to health (Mass´ e, 2003). Arguably, it has suc-
ceeded eternal salvation in its role as a core societal value
(Walzer,1983).Inaddition,health’sperceivedobjectivity
backs up the idea of its exceptional place (Cribb, 2005:
3–20).Theconcernforhealthappearsbothfundamental
and devoid of partisan ﬂavour.
However, this widespread agreement on the value of
health is misleading. It comes down to an overlapping
consensusthathealthmatterstopeopleandinadvertently
conceals the divergence of reasons for valuing health.
A cursory look at the existing conceptions of health is
sufﬁcient to show that they do not converge towards a
shared understanding of its value. For instance, an ac-
count of health as absence of disease yields a different
evaluative stance that that of health as foundations of
achievement (Boorse, 1977; Seedhouse, 2001; Nordent-
felt,2007).Layperceptionsofhealth,itsmeaningandrel-
ativeimportanceareevenmoredisparate(Blaxter,2004).
Thispresentshealthasalikelyumbrellaconcepttheubiq-
uity of which does not suggest unanimous acceptance.
More importantly, no plausible view of health is com-
patiblewiththethesisthathealthisanoverarchingvalue.
It is improbable that the pursuit of health is what makes
other goods worthwhile. On the contrary, the intelligi-
bility of this pursuit is partly sustained by values other
than health.1 Among these, freedom from pain and im-
pairmentisofparticularimportance(Engelhardt,1981).
This points towards a constitutive feature of health as
a value, which is to enable further projects and ac-
tivities. The absence of such commitments effectively
underminesthevalueofhealth.Ittakesawayanessential
part of its foundations and makes the interest in health
appear vague and shaky. Conversely, this partial depen-
dence on further values gives a rationale to undertake
certain health risks for the sake of these values.
In addition, both achieving and maintaining health
are threatened by direct, continuous efforts. The exclu-
sive focus on health is patently self-defeating as it leads
toriskaversion,reducedactivitiesandfeelingsofanxiety
and stress (Verweij, 1999, 2007). These factors affect not
only the subjective experience of well-being, but quickly
translate into serious physical symptoms (Heath, 2005).
Thus,thevalueofhealthappearstobeself-effacingintwo
complementaryways:itisbestrealisedindirectlyandasa
part of a comprehensive project capable of remedying its
original vagueness and incompleteness. In its ideal cir-
cumstance,healthgiveswaytothepursuitofothervalues.
Onlyinsituationsimposingagravethreattoone’shealth
and realisation of further constitutive projects that it is
reasonable to make health one’s primary concern. These
kindsofsituationshavetobeconsideredasexceptionalin
order to respect the self-effacing structure of the value of
health.Apublichealthpolicythattakestheseasrepresen-
tativerunstheriskofundermininghealthandbecoming
self-defeating.
It might be objected that this analysis does not take
into consideration an inﬂuential perspective which ar-
guably motivates the idea of health as an overarching
valuebyassociatinghealthandwell-being(WHO,2006).
However,thisassociationisnotoriouslylooseandcreates
moredifﬁcultiesthanitissupposedtosolve(Cribb,2005:
21–40, 2007: 550). It does not provide an explicit con-
ceptionofhealthaswell-being.Instead,itusestheoneas
ametaphoroftheotherandmakesbothideasevenmore
elusive. Moreover, such a conception would be irrepara-
bly ﬂawed since the values of health and well-being are
different in kind. Assuming some credible notion of au-
tonomous agency, the latter can be a good candidate for
ultimatevalue,whilsttheformer,asshownabove,cannot
(Grifﬁn, 1986). For instance, if one posits a minimal, or
instrumental account of practical rationality, well-being
can arguably take on the role of an ultimate, or ﬁnal,
end of all intelligible pursuits. In contrast, health cannot
satisfy the formal requirements imposed by the concept
of a ﬁnal end. For its value is underdetermined and not
self-contained.
The persistent illusion of health as an overarching
value can be explained as an upshot of mixing up ﬁrst-
and third-person perspectives on health. The attitude to
one’shealthisessentiallyprudential.ItisasunreasonablePUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND LIBERALISM • 139
to pay no attention to one’s health as it is to single out its
preservation as one’s main objective. Yet either impru-
dencediffersfromamoralfailure.Itmightberegrettable,
but not blameworthy in itself. In contrast, carelessness
towards other people’s health is morally problematic. It
often amounts to harming them directly as, for instance,
when driving in a drunk condition. This example helps
clarify the distinction between the sheer imprudence of
a behaviour and its culpability. The former focuses on
potentially disastrous consequences for the imprudent
agents themselves, whereas the latter reﬂects prospective
harmful effects on third parties. These two aspects are
not necessarily related, even though many actions that
endanger one’s health also happen to endanger other
people’s health. Smoking in closed spaces is an obvious
example. The frequent concurrence of these aspects may
lead to the impression that the corresponding actions
are made objectionable by the inattention to health they
display. In turn, this is likely to prompt the view that
health must be an overarching value since its disregard is
both imprudent and morally wrong. This conﬂation of
prudentialandmoralreasonsforvaluinghealthseemsto
animate the reinterpretation of clear-cut cases of harm
to others as public health issues. As a result, the health of
bothvictimsandperpetratorsisperceivedasanadequate
subjectofstateprotection.Followingthislogic,domestic
violence is perceived as a result of unhealthy behaviour
that is by and large socially determined and affects both
parties negatively. For instance, it is suggested that vio-
lenthusbandsmightbesufferingfromincreasedlevelsof
stressatwork(Seedhouse,2001:10–13).Thisoutlookon
domesticviolenceblurscrucialdistinctionsbetweenself-
and other-regarding aspects of objectionable actions. It
effectively undermines the straightforward justiﬁcation
forstateinterventionsthatthe‘harmprinciple’provides,
and opts for a defence based on a conceptual confusion
about the value of health.
The Role of Epidemiological
Evidence
As previously outlined, references to epidemiological
ﬁndings have been crucial in urging both revisions and
expansions of distinctly liberal approaches to public
health.Thissectionwillshowthatthesereferencescannot
establishaninescapablepathfromtheliberalrecognition
of equal access to healthcare to prescriptive policies aim-
ing at reducing health inequalities. Instead, such inter-
pretationsofthesocialgradientofhealthhavetoassume
thatthelatterisanoverarchingvalue.Thisoutcomeisim-
portant for the following two reasons. On the one hand,
it conﬁrms the pivotal role of the preceding premise that
might be overlooked because it often remains inexplicit.
On the other, it clearly indicates that this kind of public
healthproposalsbreakawayfromliberalism.Infact,they
belong to a distinct political project and understanding
of freedom, which is republican.
The argument for expanding the standard liberal
framework for public health typically contends that the
switch from healthcare to health promotion is unavoid-
able once this framework is properly linked to a socio-
logicallyinformedoutlookonhealth.Forinstance,Cribb
explainstheessenceofhealthpromotionas‘theideathat
we might turn our knowledge of the determinants of
health into action for health’ and asserts that ‘the idea
of health promotion is thus a kind of logically neces-
sary development in the historical evolution of health
care’(2007:550).However,thisdevelopmenttranscends
the liberal framework. It requires that the distribution
of broader socio-economic determinants of health is es-
sentiallyorientedtowardsimprovinghealthanddecreas-
ing health inequalities. The underlying reasoning can be
reconstructed as follows. Disease and disability can be
obstacles to full participation in a liberal political com-
munity just as race, gender or class. Therefore, a liberal
state ought to provide special protection for its citizens’
health under the principle of fair equality of opportu-
nity. This obligation includes helping citizens to restore
their health via adequate medical provision. Conversely,
when this is not possible, affected individuals should
be offered a fair compensation for their loss of oppor-
tunities. At ﬁrst glance, universal access to healthcare
and the enforcement of proper health and safety mea-
sures seem to fulﬁl the state obligation towards citizens’
health (Daniels, 1985). However, recent epidemiolog-
ical research shows that in afﬂuent countries, social ar-
rangementsaffectpeople’shealthmoredramaticallythan
the healthcare services available to them (e.g., Marmot
and Wilkinson, 2006). Therefore, a consistent protec-
tion of citizens’ health cannot be conﬁned to health-
care provision. Instead, it requires that the state miti-
gates social factors with negative impact on health. Ex-
amples are relative poverty and lack of social capital.
The conclusion is well summarised by the catchphrase
‘(social) justice is good for our health’ (Daniels et al.,
2004; Daniels, 2008: 23). Its moderate interpretation is
represented by Daniels’s latest monograph Just Health.
It is meant to revise and expand the author’s earlier
theory from Just Health Care in the light of presently
available evidence for the social gradient of health. This
moderate interpretation aims to justify the move from
healthcare to comprehensive action for health in terms
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versionsdismissequalityofopportunityasaninadequate
principle and promote its replacement with equality of
condition (Marmot, 2004: 248–257; Wilkinson, 2005:
284–287). According to these, social or economic, in-
equalities that result in unequal health outcomes are un-
acceptable. Thus, societies are called upon to account
for statistically signiﬁcant health and life expectancy
variations among their members. Moreover, the over-
all achievement of political communities is assessed on
public health grounds (Wilkinson, 2005: 1–31).
The apparent inescapability of the conclusion above
receives further support from the fact that the moder-
ate version seems unstable as it eventually collapses into
the radical one. The reason for this is the extraordinary
status it assigns to health. Once it is suggested that the
socialdeterminants ofhealthshouldbeallocated inview
ofhealthoutcomes,itbecomesdifﬁculttoresistthecon-
clusion that the principle for health distribution should
dominate the distribution of other goods such as liber-
ties,educationandincome(Wilkinson,2008).Infact,the
veryideathatatheoryofjusticeistoberecommendedfor
itsimpactonhealthisatoddswithprotectinghealthun-
der the principle of fair equality of opportunity. For this
impliesthathealthisconceived notonlyasanimportant
resource and therefore has to be preserved on account of
social fairness. In addition, health seems employed as a
litmus test for the overall quality of individual lives. In
this respect, the moderate version assumes a steady asso-
ciationbetweenhealthandwell-being.Butindoingso,it
hastoacknowledgepublichealthandlifeexpectancyasa
comprehensive standard of social justice across societies.
However, this contradicts the priority of the basic liber-
ties that deﬁnes political liberalism. Instead, it expresses
the core of a more radical understanding of social justice
as conducive to health. This understanding leads us to
consideringsomeauthoritarianregimesassuccessfuland
fair societies. For instance, Marmot commends the pop-
ular democracies of Central Europe in terms of public
health: ‘Under the new communist regimes, in the 1950s
and 1960s, people were fed, housed, educated, clothed,
employed,andtheelderlywerelookedafter.Itisnotsur-
prising to me that with this set of social arrangements,
healthshouldimprove.Itdid.’(2004:200).Thefollowing
process of liberalisation from the 1970s on is analysed in
terms of a straightforward social disintegration because
of the decline in average life expectancy.
This analysis is a logical consequence of the under-
lying idea that public health is a fair standard of so-
cial justice achieved by different states and cannot be
avoided by those who ﬁnd the idea attractive. Yet, it
clearly rests on the assumption that health is an over-
arching value, which, as demonstrated above, is in-
valid. Unless this assumption is made, it is difﬁcult
to see why equal opportunity provisions, let alone ba-
sic liberties, should be rated on their public health
impact.
The ‘stewardship model’ proposed by the Nufﬁeld
Councilpresentsanotherargumentforrevisingthestan-
dard liberal approach to public health. It relies on a
different interpretation of epidemiological evidence. As
shown in the ﬁrst section, it leads to assuming that un-
healthy choices are prima facie unfree, especially when
they belong to underprivileged groups. Thus, prescrip-
tive policies at the higher levels of the ‘intervention lad-
der’aredeemedcompatiblewiththeliberalcommitment
to the primary importance of individual choice since the
choices that they are meant to curtail, or even eliminate,
have already been discounted as unfree. However, this
line of thought depends on overstating the signiﬁcance
of epidemiological data such as the association between
lowersocioeconomicstatusandcertainunhealthyhabits,
e.g., raised alcohol consumption. Certainly, these ﬁnd-
ingsexpressstatisticallyimportantvariationsandinform
hypotheses with considerable predictive power. Never-
theless,theirhighdegreeofprobabilitydoesnotamount
toasocialdeterminationofone’sattitudetowardshealth.
Yet, this stronger, overstated dependence is necessary in
ordertoreadepidemiologicaldataasindicatingthelesser
importance of certain unhealthy choices. The latter are,
therefore, reinterpreted as covert effects of societal pres-
sures. However, this step undermines the moral signiﬁ-
canceofindividualchoiceingeneral.Foritnowseemsto
befurtheranalysableintermsofexternalinﬂuences.The
movemarksaradicaldeparturefromtheliberalcommit-
menttonon-interference.Itcertainlyassumesthathealth
must be an overarching value so that choices that fail to
match it cannot be both free and informed. In doing
so, it fails to acknowledge that persistent life expectancy
variations across society are compatible with free choice
and thoughtful realisation of one’s idea of a good life.
Social patterns of health distribution do not rule out the
possibility that people are generally in control of their
lives.Forinstance,itseemsunconvincingtousethepop-
ularityofacertainlifestyleorpracticewithinaparticular
community or a social strata in order to argue that it has
notbeenfreelychosenbutimposedonthemembers.En-
dorsingthisstrategywouldleadtotheabsurdconclusion
that one exercises proper choice only when one opts for
things that most people of a similar background would
notconsiderchoiceworthy.Hence,epidemiologicalﬁnd-
ings that correlate disadvantage with speciﬁc unhealthy
choices do not sufﬁce to write these off as unfree. Such a
useisinopportuneandmotivatedbytheinvalidassump-
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Moreimportantly,iteclipsesapromisingwayofartic-
ulating the underlying concerns about socially imposed
burdens on individual health. In fact, these concerns are
defensibleinsofarastheycommittothevalueofindivid-
ual choice and follow a plausible understanding of the
harm principle. For instance, distrust about the impor-
tance of individual choice makes it difﬁcult to argue that
some state interventions are preferable to the status quo.
Iftheeffectsofbothontheopportunitytoliveaccording
to one’s choice and judgement are neglected, neither can
be preferred without prejudice to some of the affected
parties. The objective of improving public health cannot
substitute for the missing impartial justiﬁcation since
its open-endedness reﬂects the underdetermination of
health as a value.
In contrast, epidemiological evidence can be helpfully
integrated in a valid argument for governmental initia-
tives provided that it identiﬁes genuinely harmful social
arrangements.Thedeﬁningfeatureofsucharrangements
is that they affect non-consenting parties and pre-empt
their prospects of retaining or gaining control over rel-
evant aspects of their lives, one of which is caring for
one’s health. This plausible notion of harm avoids a
common misconception, according to which harming
somebody necessarily involves making them worse off
than they have been beforehand. However, one can also
harm another by denying them what is due to them
or preventing them from improving their own condi-
tion (Raz, 1987: 327–329). Public health interventions
justiﬁed on this ground are neither intrusive, nor un-
dermining apparently unwise individual choices. Their
rationale is not curtailing such choices, but broaden-
ing the range of available options. For instance, instead
of tackling binge drinking by raising alcohol prices and
limiting sales hours as suggested by the Nufﬁeld Council
(2007), a policy proposal based on the previous consid-
erations would focus on providing sensible recreational
alternativessuchassubsidisedculturalevents,expanding
public libraries and affordable access to sport facilities.
This understanding of the harm principle is consistent
with its standard, narrow interpretation outlined in the
openingsection.Itupholdsthedistinctlyliberalcommit-
mentstofreedomasnon-interferenceandtheprotection
of individuals from powerful institutions.
Toleration, Justified Interference
and ‘Friendly Coercion’
The preceding sections showed that neither the special
characterofhealthasavaluenoritssocialdimensionac-
tually undermines the liberal approach to public health.
Furthermore, they clariﬁed that attempts to extend this
approach beyond its standard constraints, e.g., respect
for basic liberties and individual choice cannot be con-
sidered as sociologically informed versions of liberalism.
Instead, these proposals imply an alternative, republican
view. As previously outlined, republicanism takes state
interventions in its citizens’ lives to be respectful of their
freedomaslongassuchinterventionsaimtoremedypeo-
ple’s failures to implement their avowable interests. This
is a necessary background assumption in order to argue,
as observed in the previous section, that the state should
correct individual choices or social arrangements when-
ever they disregard the value of health. This conclusion
cannotbereachedbymerelyassumingthatthesechoices
andarrangementsaredeeplyproblematicbecausehealth
is an overarching value. An additional supposition is
needed to defend this kind of state intervention as con-
genialtoindividualfreedominsteadofexposingitasun-
duly intrusive. This further step is inconsistent with the
liberal conception of freedom as non-interference, but
continuous with its republican rival, freedom as non-
domination. Therefore, the remainder of the paper will
focus on the challenges to liberalism, which seem most
applicabletopublichealthandshowwhyadistinctlylib-
eral rather than a republican framework is better suited
tothisﬁeld.Asshownintheopeningsection,thesechal-
lenges primarily focus on liberalism’s alleged hostility to
irreduciblysocialgoodsanditsconceptionoffreedomas
non-interference. The latter is deemed shallow and un-
able to deal with cases where individual freedom is most
in need of defence, such as systematic oppression.
The widespread presumption that liberalism cannot
cater for irreducibly social goods is closely related to
the idea that the harm principle requires the suspension
of evaluative judgements, the objects of which are ac-
tions or attitudes with no detrimental impact on third
parties. Their further appraisal is considered irrelevant
because they have been excluded as prospective grounds
for interference. Hence, the neutrality of liberal states
is assimilated to an evaluative void inherent to liberal
societies. However, this association is mistaken. Liberal
neutrality at the political level is sustained by toleration
at the societal level. The latter is a keystone of liberalism
as a political morality. It is best understood as an irre-
duciblysocialgoodsinceitsvaluetranscendsthecomfort
ofavoidingcensorshipandmeddlingenjoyedbyindivid-
uals.Furthermore,itcannotbeachievedunlesstoleration
is largely regarded as an important value within soci-
ety (Scanlon, 1996). In fact, the practice of toleration is
bothintellectuallyandpsychologicallydemanding.Itre-
quiresthattheobjectsoftolerationareproperlyidentiﬁed
and do not get distorted in the process of making them142 • RADOILSKA
tolerable to a majority (Green, 2008). Lack of opinion,
indifference and laissez-faire preclude the possibility for
toleration, which implies an initial strong disapproval.
The principled decision to refrain from acting upon this
negative judgement whilst still upholding it deﬁnes tol-
eration (McKinnon, 2006: 31). However, such a decision
would be unintelligible unless toleration is a valued dis-
position. Its signiﬁcance relates to a key motivation for
the harm principle, according to which the enforcement
of moralitycan bemorally problematic (Hart,1963: 17).
In order to circumvent this eventuality, interference has
to be further justiﬁed with reference to harm to others
or possibly self-harm when the agent’s competence is
severely undermined. Furthermore, the instances of jus-
tiﬁedinterferencearetreatedasconstraintsonindividual
freedom instead of ways of promoting it as implied by
the republican concept of ‘friendly coercion’. This liberal
approach is far from superﬁcial. It rests on a compelling
theoryofagencythataptlyavoidsthepitfallsofthealter-
nativeviewoffreedomasnon-domination.Forinstance,
the rationale for ‘friendly coercion’ builds on the intu-
itionthat agents may have somegoodreasons for action,
of which they are fully or partially unaware. As a re-
sult, agents may not appreciate some of their important,
avowable interests. Sometimes, an observer may have a
better grasp of these than the agents themselves. This
intuition is both uncontroversial and equally compati-
ble with either internalism or externalism about reasons
for action. It does not depend on settling the issue of
whether prospective reasons should to be traceable to
one’s actual motivations or not (Williams, 1981, 1995;
Johnson, 1999).
However, ‘friendly coercion’ requires an additional
step, according to which an action that promotes some-
body’s avowable interests by constraining their choice
does not in fact diminish their freedom. This step is
unconvincing. It enjoys some plausibility on speciﬁc oc-
casions such as the original example of ‘friendly coer-
cion’, in which Ulysses’ companions follow his preced-
ing orders, keep him bound to the ship’s mast and save
him from the spell of the Sirens (Pettit, 2001: 75–77).
However, this cannot be used as a model for uphold-
ing individual freedoms by the public authorities. For
the way of realising one’s avowable interests is critical.
Failing to act on one’s better reasons may indicate sub-
optimal agency. Yet, if these reasons were implemented
by somebody else, this would neither make up for one’s
inadequate agency, nor suggest a viable route for im-
provement. ‘Friendly coercion’ robs one’s initiative as an
agent and undermines one’s authority over one’s life. It
eventually fosters dependence rather than counterbal-
ance the subtle effects of arbitrary power that the harm
principle presumably cannot pick up. Thus, instead of
coping with covert forms of oppression, the underlying
conceptionoffreedomasnon-dominationinadvertently
providesachannelforthese.Forinstance,itisconsistent
with an authoritarian approach to citizens’ welfare such
asimprovingpublichealthbycurtailingpublicfreedoms
and making people’s lives more secure and predictable.
No republican safeguards seem capable of averting this
danger as long as the state retains the ultimate task of
trackingpeople’savowableinterests(cf.Pettit,2001:152–
174). Its pervasiveness threatens to absorb and dilute
individual agency. This feature categorically sets politi-
cal trusteeship apart from well-deﬁned instances of en-
trustingprojectsanddelegatingresponsibilitiestoothers
(Hardin, 1999). The latter strengthen individual agency
insofar as they enable the achievement of a wider range
of goals and facilitate the development of valuable social
skills (Hardin, 1991; Pettit, 1995). Yet, this conclusion
cannotbeextrapolatedtowardstheformer,politicalcase
becauseitsopen-endednesspotentiallyunderminesindi-
vidualagency.Followingthislineofthought,itisunclear
as to how the state’s actively tracking citizens’ avowable
interestscanbepreventedfromforcefullyredeﬁningwhat
is avowable by them.
In contrast, interference based on the harm principle
is free from self-defeating consequences. It focuses on
sustaining the conditions for autonomous agency rather
than trying to make people autonomous. Only in ex-
treme circumstances is one’s authority in implementing
one’s interests questioned. The shared commitment to
the value of toleration helps keep at bay temptations to
pressuredissidentfellowcitizensintomoreconventional
lifestyles. This is of special relevance to public health
ethics given the paradoxical way in which modern so-
cieties express their ‘impatience with moral authority’,
namely by embracing technical expertise in general and
medicalcompetenceinparticular(Elliott,2003:xxi).Fol-
lowingthistrend,intolerantattitudestowardsunpopular
practicesandchoicesarelikelytobearticulatedasprofes-
sional concerns about negative health outcomes. In this
context, it seems paramount that public health ethics
rests on ﬁrm liberal grounds and avoids the danger of
dissociating health protection from the ability to lead a
meaningful and rewarding life of one’s choosing.
Conclusion
Concerns about public health are often considered at
odds with a liberal outlook on social and political life.
The harm principle is criticised for providing an insufﬁ-
cientdefenceofthevulnerableandpromptingunjustiﬁed
distrust towards public goals. This trend is expressed byPUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND LIBERALISM • 143
a set of proposals that aim to revise liberalism in light of
bothpublichealth’srationaleandrecentepidemiological
ﬁndings. I argued that these proposals are misconceived
in several ways.
First, I demonstrated that they rely on a normative
premise according to which health is an overarching
value. This premise was then proven untenable since it
failstoappreciatetheaxiologicalunderpinningsofhealth
asaself-effacingvalue,thechoiceworthinessandsuccess-
fulrealisationofwhichpartlyderivefromacommitment
to further values.
Second, I clariﬁed that epidemiological evidence such
as the social gradient of health or speciﬁc covariations
between one’s status and attitude towards health can-
not justify attempts to expand the original liberal frame-
work. These attempts depend on the preceding, ﬂawed
normative premise. They fail to provide a sociologically
informed extension of liberalism.
Third,Irelatedtheseproposalstotheirunobviousthe-
oreticalbackground,whichisrepublican,andshowedthe
advantages of liberalism in the context of public health.
In particular, I argued that its conception of freedom
as non-interference and a narrow understanding of the
harm principle can integrate epidemiological evidence
into a sound argument for sufﬁcient state interventions.
Their primary focus would be the adverse conditions
andlimitationspromptingunhealthychoicesratherthan
the unhealthy choices themselves. This liberal approach
helpsavoidtheperverseeffectsofpoliciesthatprotectthe
vulnerable by disregarding their choices and substanti-
ates a principled commitment to the value of toleration
in public health ethics.
Note
1. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 7, which intro-
duces the notion of goods, which are choiceworthy
both in themselves and for the sake of further, supe-
rior goods.
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